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MEDICAL LAW-THE RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUG 
TREATMENT: SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS AND PROCEDURAL GUIDE­
LINES IN MASSACHUSETTs-Rogers v. Commissioner of the Mental 
Health Department, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983) 
The right of the mentally ill to refuse antipsychotic drug treat­
ment) has provoked endless debate between the medical and legal 
communities.2 While common agreement exists that a competent pa­
tient has a right to participate in the treatment decisionmaking pro­
cess,3 no agreement exists whether incompetent patients have that 
I. Antipsychotic drugs are a psychotherapeutic agent within the category of psycho­
tropic drugs and are used to treat psychoses. Baldessarini, Drugs and Treatment ofPsychi­
atric Disorders, in THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 391, (L. Goodman 
and A. Gilman eds. 6th ed. 1980). The parties in Rogers focused exclusively on anti­
psychotics such as Thorazine, Mellaril, Prolixin and Haldol. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 
653 n.l (1st Cir. 1980). 
Although such medication is useful in controlling various psychoses, it may also exac­
erbate psychotic symptoms, cause confusion, stupor or coma, or cause neuromuscular reac­
tions resembling Parkinsons disease. The most serious consequence of modem day 
psychotropic drug use in mental hospitals is tardive dyskinesia. See Plotkin, Invisible Man­
acles: Drugging Mentally Retarded People, 31 STAN. L. R. 637, 638-39 (1979); Plotkin, 
Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 461, 485-90 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Plotkin, Therapeutic Orgy]; Guardianship of 
Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 438-39, 421 N.E.2d 40,53-54 (1981). Even if a patient's mental illness 
is not exacerbated, certain therapies often cause distressing, and occasionally fatal effects. 
Id. 
Furthermore, antipsychotic drug treatment is often abused in state hospitals. See, e.g., 
Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 926 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (use of antipsychotic drugs as 
punishment); Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 (D. N.J. 1979) (hospital use of 
medication as a form of control and as a substitute for treatment); Clites v. State, 322 
N.W.2d 917, 921 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (expediency program rather than therapeutic pro­
gram). See generally Baldessarini & Lipinski, Risks vs. Benefits ofAntipsychotic Drugs, 289 
NEW. ENG. J. MED. 427 (1973) (institutional pressures to reduce the number of hospital 
beds or lengths of hospitalization have led to the "sometimes senseless ritualization of drug 
therapy" and better use of antipsychotic incorporates them into long term management of 
complex psychological and medical problems); Zander, Prolixin Decanoate: Big Brother by 
Injection? 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 55, 67-69 (1977) (the abuse of antipsychotic drugs as a 
method of control). 
2. See generally REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS­
VALUES IN CONFLICT (A. Doudera & J. Swazey eds. 1982) (collection of essays prepared 
by medical and legal experts on issues involved in the right to refute mental health treat­
ment) [hereafter cited as REFUSING TREATMENT]. 
3. See infra notes 12-46 and accompanying text; See also Bonnie, The Psychiatric 
Patient's Right to Refuse Medication: A Survey of the Legal Issues, in REFUSING TREAT­
MENT, supra note 2, at 19. 
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same right. The disagreement stems from a marked difference in val­
ues, ethical principles, and practical considerations.4 Medical experts 
are concerned with their ability to treat a group of individuals who 
generally do not possess the competence adequately to decide their 
diagnostic futures. 5 The legal community, however, is concerned with 
preserving those individuals' right to human autonomy,6 equality,1 
and individualism. 8 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court indicated deference to 
those legal concerns in its recent decision in Rogers v. Commissioner of 
the Department of Mental Health. 9 The supreme judicial court held 
that patients who are involuntarily committed to state mental hospi­
tals have a right to either accept or refuse treatment by mind-altering 
drugs personally, or judicially if they have been adjudicated incompe­
tent. JO The ruling assumes significance because it is the first ruling by 
the supreme judicial court concerning the use of antipsychotic drugs 
on institutionalized patients under state law. I I This note examines the 
supreme judicial court's ruling in Rogers. First, it traces the back­
4. See Bonnie, supra note 3 at 19-20. See also infra notes 97-105, 116-121 and ac­
companying text. 
5. Studies show that more than half of all institutionalized patients are incompetent 
to give consent, even on such issues as the need for admission. See Contemporary Studies 
Project: Facts and Fallacies about Iowa Civil Commitment, 55 IOWA L. REV. 895, 918 
(1970); Brief for Petitioners at 54-68, Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). In Mills v. 
Rogers, counsel for defendants argued before the Supreme Court that allowing patients to 
refuse treatment causes vast administrative problems. He stated: "Allowing a patient to 
refuse medication will also have an umbrella effect increasing the number of patients rele­
gated to warehoused status in our state hospitals. The failure to forcibly medicate an indi­
vidual patient refusing medication would affect the entire milieu of a hospital. [Ojne 
patient refusing medication frequently set off a sort of contagion of refusal." Id. But see 
Okin v. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1369-70 (D. Mass. 1979) (where Judge Tauro made 
findings of fact that his temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive order had 
not caused any such effect). Cf infra text accompanying note 164. 
6. See infra notes 32-45 and accompanying text. See also Ehrlich, Freedom of 
Choice: Personal Autonomy and the Right to Privacy, 14 IDAHO L. REV. 447 (1978); Devel­
opments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally III, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1195 
n.12 [hereinafter cited as Civil Commitment j. 
7. Where the state allows voluntary patients, whether mentally ill or physically ill, to 
make their own treatment decisions, but denies the right to involuntarily confined yet com­
petent mental patients, no rational distinction exists and a denial of equal protection may 
result. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
8. See authorities cited supra note 6. 
9. 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983). 
10. Id. at 491, 458 N.E.2d at 310. 
11. The Massachusetts court, however, has indirectly discussed this issue in previous 
cases. See In re Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981); Super­
intendant of BeIchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). 
See also Note, Medication and Adjudication: Extending In re Richard Roe III to Institu­
tionalized Psychiatric Patients, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1029 (1981). 
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ground and history of the right to refuse medical treatment. Next, it 
discusses both the substantive rights of involuntarily committed pa­
tients and the procedural treatment guidelines as set forth in the Rog­
ers decision. Finally, it discusses inherent problems under 
Massachusett's present procedure for judicial competency proceedings 
and substituted judgment treatment decisions. 
II. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT 
Both the common law and the Constitution provide bases for an 
individual's right to refuse medical treatment. The earliest line of de­
cisions which addressed this issue cited the common law principle that 
individuals are protected from an intentional interference with their 
physical being. 12 Our ancestors believed that "[n]o right is held more 
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the 
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own per­
son, free from all restraint or interference of others...."13 Recog­
nized as the common law tort of assault and battery,14 the theory 
provided one form of legal action against physicians for unauthorized 
treatment. 15 
Derived from the tort of assault and battery, informed consent 
developed as a later basis for refusal of treatment. 16 This doctrine es­
poused the basic prinicple that "every human being of adult years and 
12. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospitals, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 
N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (competent adult has right to determine allowable bodily invasions), 
overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N. Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 
(1957); Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 575, 137 P. 96, 97 (1913) (an individual's right to 
inviolability prevents a physician from interfering with a patient's bodily integrity without 
consent). Cf Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S . .11 (1905). In Jacobson the Supreme 
Court recognized the right of an individual to assert supremacy of his own wiII in refusing 
state mandated vaccinations. The Court, however, noted that "in a well-ordered society 
charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual 
in respect of his liberty may" be subordinated to society's interest. Id. at 29. See generally 
Plotkin, Therapeutic Orgy, supra note I, at 485-90 (discussion of the various common law 
theories of the right to refuse treatment). 
13. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
14. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 10, at 36-37 (4th ed. 1971). 
15. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospitals, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 
92,93 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957). The court stated that: 
[T]he wrong complained of is not merely negligence. It is trespass. Every human 
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done 
with his own body; a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's 
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages. 
Id. 
16. See PROSSER, supra note 14 at § 18, 101-102; Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 
(D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). 
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sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body."17 In the oft cited decision of Canterbury v. Spence 18 the D.C. 
Circuit relied on the concept of informed consent. The case involved 
an action against a physician who performed back surgery on a patient 
without first informing him of the risk of paralysis. 19 The court stated: 
It is the settled rule that therapy not authorized by the patient 
may amount to a tort-a common law battery by the physician. 
And it is evident that it is normally impossible to obtain consent 
worthy of the name unless the physician first elucidates the options 
and perils for the patient's edification.20 
The application of common law theories to a committed mental 
patient's right to refuse treatment, however, has been questioned in the 
past. 21 A judicial decision to commit was often interpreted as an im­
plicit finding that a person was unable to make treatment decisions. 22 
Physicians argued, therefore, that commitment without accompanying 
authority to treat would render the act of hospitalization absurd. 23 
The force of the argument, however, is diminished by the more recent 
recognition that commitment to a mental institution does not auto­
matically render patients legally incompetent to exercise their treat­
ment rights. 24 The Third Circuit discussed the modern view in Rennie 
v. Klein 25 in which mental health patients sued state officials for in­
junctive relief from the forcible administration of drugs. The court 
reasoned that although a person may be mentally ill and involuntarily 
committed to a state hospital, the law still considers that person com­
petent to some extent. 26 It stated that commitment limits but does not 
17. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Schloendorff 
v. Society of N.Y. Hospitals, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, \05 N.E. 92,93 (1914), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. \064 (1972). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 783. 
21. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 
(1971) (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Prince v. Sheppard, 
307 Minn. 250, 258-59, 239 N.W.2d 905, 911 (1976) (emphasizing a need for the state to 
assume the decision making role regarding the psychiatric treatment for one who is unable 
to rationally do so for himself, presumptively based on the fact of commitment on grounds 
of mental illness). 
22. See Plotkin, Therapeutic Orgy, supra note I, at 489. But see, MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch.123, § 25 (West Supp. 1983). 
23. Plotkin, Therapeutic Orgy, supra note I, at 489. 
24. See, e.g., Rogers, 390 Mass. 489, 497, 458 N.E.2d 308, 313-14 (1983); Rogers v. 
Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 658-59 (1st Cir. 1980); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 843 (3d Cir. 
1981 ). 
25. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981). 
26. Id. at 846. 
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extinguish an individual's right to be free from confinement and per­
sonal intrusion.27 Thus, absent a compelling interest to treat, an invol­
untarily committed mental patient retains a common law right of 
action for non-consensual treatment by a private physician.28 
In addition to common law origins, constitutional principles such 
as the right to privacy,29 freedom of thought,30 and protection from 
cruel and unusual punishment3! also support the right to refuse treat­
ment. The much publicized decision in In re Quinlan 32 first extended 
the constitutional right to privacy to include the right to refuse medi­
cal treatment. The New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the parents of 
a comatose patient to withdraw her from a mechanical respirator 
thereby asserting their daughter's right of privacy.33 Since that deci­
sion a number of other courts have recognized the privacy right to 
27. Id. 
28. Case Comment, The Forcible Medication ofInvoluntarily Committed Mental Pa­
tients with Antipsychotic Drugs-Rogers v. Okin, 15 GA. L. REV. 739, 756 (1980) [hereinaf­
ter cited as Case Comments, Forcible Medication]. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 947 
(3d Cir. 1976) (patient had a right to refuse Thorazine and, absent an emergency, uncon­
sented to medical treatment is a tort); Stowers v. Ardmore Acres Hosp., 19 Mich. App. 
115, 122, 172 N.W.2d 497, 500-01 (1969) (person not adjudged mentally incompetent 
before commitment had action for assault and battery against treating physician who forci­
bly injected plaintiff with medication), affd sub nom., Stowers v. Wolodzko, 386 Mich. 
119, 191 N.W.2d 355 (1971). 
29. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Ehrlich, supra note 6; see also notes 
32-37 and accompanying text. The right to due process is used as another constitutional 
basis for the mentally ill to refuse treatment. See Note, Civil Rights-A Mental Patient's 
Right Needing Protection, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 406, 412 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 
Note, Civil Rights]. See also Rennie, 653 F.2d at 841 n.6 (distinction between refusing 
treatment on due process grounds or privacy grounds is illusory). 
30. The idea, based on the first amendment right to freedom of expression, was rec­
ognized in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969). See infra notes 38-45 and accom­
panying text. See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) ("... in a 
free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than 
coerced by the State"). 
31. The eighth amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. 
VIII. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. See generally Symonds, Mental Pa­
tients'Right to Refuse Drugs: Involuntary Medication as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 
HAST!NGS CONST. L.Q. 701 (1980) (author discusses the merits of using the eighth amend­
ment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as an argument against forced 
medication of committed patients). The Supreme Court of the United States recognized 
that forced medication may be a condition of confinement to a mental hospital, requiring 
due process is necessary before a prisoner is transferred from a jail to a hospital. Vitek v. 
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489 (1980). 
32. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). 
33. Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671. The court did raise the competency issue when it 
noted that under ordinary circumstances the patients right of choice would be based upon 
her competency to assert it. Id. 
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refuse medical treatment. 34 Lower court decisions have suggested that 
involuntarily committed mental patients could assert the same right 
absent a compelling state interest;35 the Supreme Court of the United 
States, however, has declined to consider the issue. 36 
The first amendment right to freedom of expression provides yet 
another constitutional basis for the right to refuse medical treatment. 37 
In the past, patients who sought to refuse medical treatment on reli­
gious grounds relied on this argument. 38 More recently, however, it 
has supported the argument that individuals have the right to be free 
from involuntary mind control. 39 Advocates of this position reason 
that since the first amendment protects the expression of ideas and 
thoughts, it must be extended to protect an individual's right to gener­
ate those ideas and thoughts.40 Courts have accepted this reasoning in 
cases which involve the right of involuntarily committed patients to 
refuse mental health treatment.41 
The eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
34. See, e.g., Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (competent pa· 
tient at state mental institution allowed to refuse drug treatment absent danger to himself 
or others in the institution); Superintendant of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (terminally ill patient was allowed to refuse chemother· 
apy); In re Quakenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978) (a competent adult may 
refuse a leg amputation). 
35. See, e.g., Okin v. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1360·71 (D. Mass. 1979). See also 
Civil Commitment, supra note 6, at 1194; Note, Mental Health-The Right to Refuse Drug 
Therapy Under "Emergency Restraining Statutes", 11 NEW ENG. L. REV. 509, 535 (1976). 
36. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 304·05 (1982). 
37. This right to freedom of expression includes both the right of an individual to 
communicate and the action or process of thinking. See Plotkin, Therapeutic Orgy, supra 
note I, at 494; Rhoden, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARV. C.R.·C.L. L. 
REV. 363, 388·96 (1980). 
38. See Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 69·70 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
985 (1971); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
39. See Okin v. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979); Kaimowitz v. 
Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, No. 73·19434 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973), reprinted in A. 
BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902, 916·20 (1974) 
(court accepted this theory in a case in which a state hospital wanted to submit a mental 
patient to experimental psychosurgery). Cj. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143·44 
(D.N.J. 1978) (held that if forced medication is appropriate, the temporary dulling of the 
senses accompanying the medication does not violate the first amendment). 
40. Note, Civil Rights, supra note 29 at 411; See Plotkin, Therapeutic Orgy, supra 
note I, at 494·95. 
41. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143·44 (D.N.J. 1978). The parties 
in Rogers raised the issue in the U.S. District Court. Okin v. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 
1367 (D. Mass. 1979). The court held that the first amendment right to free expression and 
thought does include the mental patient's right to be free from involuntary mind control. 
[d. Neither the appellate court, Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 654 n.2 (1st Cir. 1980), nor 
the United States Supreme Court, Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 303·06 (1982), however, 
reached this issue on appeal or certiorari. 
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punishment42 is less frequently cited than first amendment freedom of 
expression and privacy rights as a basis for refusing medical treatment. 
The difficulty in relating it to individuals' rights to refuse treatment 
arises from its normal application in penal rather than medical con­
texts.43 The Court discussed the principle, however, in Knecht v. Gill­
man 44 which involved the behavioral medical treatment of prison 
inmates. The Eighth Circuit held that forcible administration of a 
pormorphine to induce prolonged and violent vomiting constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment if used as treatment of inmates' behav­
ioral problems.45 The applicability of this particular constitutional ar­
gument to involuntarily committed mental patients remains somewhat 
limited since officials rarely characterize their treatment as 
"punishment."46 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF ROGERS 
Rogers originated in 1975 in the United States District Court in 
Massachusetts as a class action against the Commissioner of the De­
partment of Mental Health, numerous doctors, and administrative 
staff members at the May and Austin Units of Boston State Hospital. 47 
The plaintiffs, both voluntary and involuntary patients at the Boston 
Hospital, challenged the constitutionality of forced medication and in­
voluntary seclusion of patients in non-emergency circumstances.48 
The District Court denied damages49 but granted injunctive relief 
based on its determination that mental patients not adjudicated incom­
petent possess a constitutional right to refuse freatment in non-emer­
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See supra note 31 for tellt of this amendment. 
43. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968) (use of strap as 
disciplinary measure in state penitentiary violates eighth amendment guarantee against 
cruel and unusual punishment); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1967) 
(eighth amendment forbids confining prisoner in bitter cold and depriving him of basic 
elements of hygiene). 
44. 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973). 
45. Id. at 1140. 
46. See Case Comments, Forcible Medication, supra note 28 at 744-45. Contra Vitek 
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980); see supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
47. Okin v. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1352 (D. Mass. 1979). The plaintiffs sought 
injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 1352. 
48. Id. The plaintiffs' arguments focused on their constitutional right to refuse treat­
ment. They conceded, however, that their right is not absolute but rather one which is 
subordinate to the hospital's right to provide emergency care when the safety of the individ­
ual patient, or other patients, is threatened. 
49. Id. at 1375-89. The court made various findings of fact and conclusions of law 
concerning the defendants' treatment and seclusion practices. It determined that on the 
basis of the evidence submitted, the plaintiffs failed to prove that defendants' treatment and 
seclusion practices were not in accordance with acceptable medical standards. Id. at 1389. 
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gency situations. 50 Further, it held that in the event of an adjudication 
of incompetence, patients' guardians could exercise any rights to make 
treatment decisions which the patient possessed. 51 
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the denial of damages,52 but 
vacated and remanded the issue of injunctive relief. 53 The court indi­
cated that physicians could use their discretion in deciding to adminis­
ter drugs forcibly, but only after balancing the interests of the patients 
against the State's interest in preventing violence within the institu­
tion. 54 Furthermore, the court expanded the definition of an "emer­
gency" situation in which patients could be treated against their Will,55 
and held that state officials need not seek a guardian's approval for 
individual treatment decisions. 56 Thus, the appellate court decision 
allowed physicians greater latitude in treatment decisions than did the 
District Court; it retained, however, the requirement of a judicial de­
termination of incapacity to decide treatment decisions in non-emer­
gency situations. 57 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether an involuntarily committed mental patient possesses a consti­
tutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. 58 The 
Supreme Court, however, refused to rule on the constitutional issue. 
Rather, it vacated and remanded the case to the circuit court for a 
50. Id. at 1365-67. The judge enjoined the defendants from forcibly medicating pa­
tients except in an "emergency" which the judge defined as "circumstances in which a 
failure [to treat] ... would bring about a substantial likelihood of physical harm to the 
patients or others". Id. at 1371. 
51. Id. at 1364. 
52. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1980). The plaintiffs appealed the 
denial of damages by the District Court and the defendants questioned the parameters of 
the injunctive relief in a cross-appeal. 
53. Id. at 653. Judge Coffin stated that the circuit court was in "substantial agree­
ment with portions of the district court's reasoning" but it was necessary to modify several 
important aspects of the lower court's ruling. Id. 
54. Id. at 656-57. The court stated that the District Court's "substantial likelihood 
of physical harm" standard was too narrow. Id. at 659-60. 
55. Id. "Emergency" included those situations in which an incompetent patient's 
health would significantly deteriorate without medication. Id. The court gave no gui­
dance, however, on what this standard meant or how it could be applied. 
56. Id. at 661. 
57. Id. 
58. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 293 (1982). Defendants petitioned the Supreme 
Court to review the First Circuit ruling that involuntarily committed patients may refuse 
antipsychotic drug treatment. Defendants stressed two basic reasons why the court should 
not recognize such a right. First, the right of refusal would impair the state's interest in 
maintaining order and treating other patients. Brief for Petitioners at 54-68, Mills v. Rog­
ers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). Second, the original commitment decision would act as a suffi­
cient predicate for administering drug treatment. Id. 
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determination of committed patients' rights, both substantively and 
procedurally, under Massachusetts law. 59 On remand, the First Cir­
cuit court certified nine questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts.60 
III. THE ROGERS V. COMMISSIONER DECISION 
The supreme judicial court's decision in Rogers extended the right 
to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs to institutionalized pa­
tients in Massachusetts.61 Although the supreme judicial court previ­
ously speculated on that right in Guardianship ofRoe,62 Rogers is the 
first ruling on the issue under Massachusetts common and statutory 
law.63 The unanimous opinion, written by Justice Abrams, divided 
the nine certified questions into four groups. Discussion follows which 
addresses each of those groups individually. 
A. 	 Competence of Involuntarily Committed Patients to Make 
Treatment Decisions; Judicial Determination of 
Incompetence 64 
The supreme judicial court concluded in Rogers that, except in an 
59. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 305-06 (1981). The court stated that in theory it 
could "define the scope of a patient's federally protected liberty interest without reference 
to state law." It indicated, however, that the "substantive rights provided by the Federal 
Constitution define only a minimum." Id. at 300 (emphasis added). Further, the court 
stated that the state law recognize liberty interests which are more extensive than federal 
rights. Id. The court decided, therefore, to remand the case to the circuit court for a 
determination of the plaintiffs' rights under state law. Id. at 306. 
The Supreme Court's decision to remand was also influenced by the supreme judicial 
court's decision in Roe which was decided whiie the Mills case (see supra note 58) was 
before the Supreme Court. On remand, the circuit court was to determine how Roe may 
have changed or defined Massachusetts law and whether that decision required a revision 
of its decision or certification of dispositive state-law questions to the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts. Id. 
60. Rogers v. Commissioner, 390 Mass. at 494, 458 N.E.2d at 312. 
61. Id. at 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983). 
62. 383 Mass. 415, 441-42, 421 N.E.2d 4055 (1981). 
63. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 494 n.7, 458 N.E.2d at 312 n.7. The court indicated that 
since the Supreme Court's opinion was predicated on the decision in Roe, the answers to 
the certified questions were controlled under statutory and common law and thus the court 
did not discuss the issues under the state constitution. Id. 
64. Id. at 494, 458 N.E.2d at 312. This section of the opinion addressed the first 
three certified questions concerning "Non-Emergency Situations": 
I. Under state law, does the civil involuntary commitment of a person to a 
mental institution constitute a determination of incompetency to make treatment 
decisions? 
2. If not, does state law, in the absence of an emergency justifying exercise 
of the state's police power or an imminent threat to a patient's condition 
justifying exercise of the state's parens patriae power, require a probate court 
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"emergency,"65 a judicial adjudication of incompetence to make treat­
ment decisions must precede any determination to override patient's 
rights to make their own treatment decisions.66 The court clearly indi­
cated that committment to a mental institution under Massachusetts 
law does not indicate incompetence to make treatment decisions.67 
The court noted that Massachusetts statutes instead "comprehend" 
the competence of an involuntarily committed patient to make treat­
ment decisions.68 
The court derived its conclusions from various sections of Massa­
chusetts General Laws Annotated chapter 12369 and from previous 
case law. 70 Section twenty-five of chapter 123 states that an individual 
is not deemed incompetent to manage his own affairs solely by reason 
of admission or commitment to a mental health facility.71 The court 
noted that two factors control civil commitment in Massachusetts: 
1) a finding of mental illness; and 2) a showing that failure to commit 
the person would create a likelihood of serious harm.72 The court in-
finding of incompetence and appointment of a guardian as the exclusive method 
for determining incompetency to make treatment decisions? 
3. If, in the circumstances described in question no. 2, probate proceedings 
are not the exclusive method for determining incompetency to make treatment 
decisions, what other procedure or procedures may be sufficient under state law? 
Id. at 494 & n.8, 458 N.E.2d at 312 & n.8. 
65. The court defined emergencies as situations in which "a patient poses an immi­
nent threat of harm to himself or others," and only if there is no less intrusive alternatives 
to antipsychotic drugs. Id. at 510-11,458 N.E.2d at 321-22. 
66. Id. at 498, 458 N.E.2d at 314. See, e.g., Rennie, 653 F.2d at 846; Winters v. 
Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971). 
67. Id. at 497, 458 N.E.2d at 314. See Roe, 383 Mass. at 442 & n.15, 421 N.E.2d at 
55 & n.15 ("a person is presumed to be competent unless shown by the evidence not to be 
competent," even while committed to a public or private institution); Boyd v. Registrars of 
Voters of Belchertown, 368 Mass. 631, 635-36, 334 N.E.2d 629, 632 (1975) (residence at 
Belchertown State School does not itself render person incompetent). 
68. 	 Rogers, 390 Mass. at 496, 458 N.E.2d at 313. 
69. 	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123, §§ 1,7,8,25 (West Supp. 1983). 
70. See, e.g., Matter of Moe, 385 Mass. 555,432 N.E.2d 712 (1982); Roe, 383 Mass. 
415,421 N.E.2d 40 (1981). 
71. 	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123, § 25. 
No person shall be deemed to be incompetent to manage his own affairs, to 
contract, to hold professional or occupational or vehicle operators licenses or to 
make a will solely by reason of his admission or commitment in any capacity to 
the treatment or care of the department or to any public or private facility, nor 
shall departmental regulations restrict such rights. 
Id. 
72. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 495, 458 N.E.2d at 312. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch.123, § 7(a) (West Supp. 1983) which states: "The superintendent of a facility may peti­
tion the district court . . . for the commitment . . . of any patient at said facility whom 
said superintendent determines that the failure to hospitalize would create a likelihood of 
serious harm by reason of mental illness." Id. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123, 
135 1984] 	 RIGHT TO REFUSE 
terpreted the factors as requiring "no adjudication of judgmental ca­
pacity." The court concluded, therefore, that no requirement exists 
that a person be incompetent in order to be committed.73 
Given that one statutory definition specifically includes "judg­
ment" as a criteria for a finding of "likelihood of serious harm,"74 the 
court interpreted the two factors liberally. The definitions of 
"[l]ikelihood of serious harm" in section one of chapter 123 include a 
"very substantial risk of physical impairment or injury to the person 
himself as manifested by evidence that such person's judgment is so 
affected that he is unable to protect himself in the community."75 The 
court dismissed the relevance of this definition by stating that "[it] 
says nothing concerning . . . competence to make treatment 
decisions. "76 
In addition to considering the sections of Chapter 123 which ad­
dress the criteria for civil commitment, the court examined those sec­
tions which relate to patients' rights to manage their own affairs. 77 
This right exists for patients under the present statutory scheme.78 It 
encompasses the right to make basic decisions concerning personal 
care and maintenance of physical and mental health.79 The court in 
Rogers concluded, therefore, that the right to make specific treatment 
§ 8(a) (West Supp. 1983) which states "[a]fter a hearing ... the district court shall not 
order the commitment of a person at a facility . . . unless it finds after a hearing that 
(I) such person is mentally ill, and (2) the discharge of such person from a facility would 
create a likelihood of serious harm." Id. 
73. 	 Rogers, 390 Mass. at 495, 458 N.E.2d at 313. 
74. Section I, the definitional section of Chapter 123, lists three different definitions 
for "likelihood of serious harm"; 
(I) [A] substantial risk of physical harm to the person himself as manifested by 
evidence of threats of, or attempts at, suicide or serious bodily harm; (2) a sub­
stantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by evidence of homi­
cidal or other violent behavior or evidence that others are placed in reasonable 
fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them; or (3) a very substan­
tial risk of physical impairment or injury to the person himself as manifested by 
evidence that such person's judgment is so affected that he is unable to protect 
himself in the community and that reasonable provision for his protection is not 
available in the community. 
MASS. 	GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123, § I (West Supp. 1983). 
The court summarily dismissed the first two definitions as "provid(ing) no adjudica­
tion of judgmental capacity." Rogers, 390 Mass. at 495, 458 N.E.2d at 313 (quoting Rogers 
v. Okin, 634 F.2d at 658). The court stated that commitment under these two definitions 
"is based on a determination of risk of physical harm to the individual or to others." Id. 
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123, § I (West Supp. 1983). 
76. 	 Rogers, at 495, 458 N.E.2d at 313. 
77. 	 Id. at 494-96,458 N.E.2d at 312-14. 
78. 	 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123, § 25 (West Supp. 1983). 
79. Fazio v. Fazio, 375 Mass. 394,403,378 N.E.2d 951, 957 (1978). 
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decisions derives from the patients' right to manage their affairs. 80 
Only after a judge, through an incompetency proceeding,81 finds pa­
tients incapable of taking care of themselves by reason of mental ill­
ness do these decisions become the responsibility of an appointed 
guardian, rather than the patients.82 
The court proceeded to reject defendant's argument that doctors 
should make treatment decisions for involuntarily committed patients, 
whether competent or not. 83 It had previously held in Harnish v. Chil­
dren's Hospital Medical Center 84 "that every competent adult has a 
right to forego treatment, or even cure, if it entails what for him are 
intolerable consequences or risks despite the views of the medical pro­
fession."85 Accordingly, since involuntarily committed patients are 
presumed competent, until adjudicated otherwise, both case law and 
statutory law dictate that they possess the right to refuse treatment. 86 
B. 	 The Decision to Treat Incompetent Mental Patients with 
Antipsychotic Drugs 87 
The court began its discussion of the use of antipsychotic drugs 
on incompetent mental patients with the premise that a general right 
exists to refuse medical treatment in appropriate circumstances.88 The 
court stated that "the recognition of that right must extend to the 
cases of an incompetent, as well as a competent, patient because the 
80. 	 Rogers, at 496, 458 N.E.2d at 313. 
81. 	 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.201, § 6 (West Supp. 1983). 
82. 	 Rogers, at 497, 458 N.E.2d at 314. 
83. 	 Id. 
84. 	 387 Mass. 152, 154,439 N.E.2d 240, 242 (1982). 
85. 	 Id. (quoting Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.l. 606, 624, 295 A.2d 676, 687 (1972». 
86. 	 Rogers, at 498, 458 N.E.2d at 314. 
87. The section addressed certified questions 4 and 5 concerning "Non-emergency 
Situations": 
4. If a proper determination of incompetency to make treatment decisions has 
been made, and in the absence of an emergency justifying exercise of the state's 
police power or an imminent threat to a patient's condition justifying exercise of 
the state's parens patriae power, under state law must there be a substituted 
judgment decision, or other decision by a person aside from the incompetent, 
prior to the administration of psychotropic drugs? 
5. If so, who may make such a decision, what procedures must be followed, 
and what factors must be considered? 
Id. at 499 n.13, 458 N.E.2d at 315 n.l3. 
88. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 499, 458 N.E.2d at 315. See supra notes 1246 and accom· 
panying text. See also Superintendant of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 
728,745·46,370 N.E.2d 417, 427·28 (1977); Gaughan and LaRue, The Right ofa Mental 
Patient to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs in an Institution, 4 LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY REV. 43, 
74 (1978). ' 
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value of human dignity extends to both."89 The court concluded, 
therefore, that if an involuntarily committed patient refuses anti­
psychotic drug treatment and is subsequently adjudicated incompe­
tent, those charged with his or her protection must seek a judicial 
substituted judgment decision.9o 
Under the substituted judgment standard, the guardian or doc­
tors for incompetent involuntarily committed patients must petition 
the court for a substitute judgement by a judge concerning the treat­
ment decision.91 The judge must determine "with as much accuracy 
as possible" the wants and needs of the individuals involved.92 As the 
court in Rogers indicated, the decision should be that which would 
have been made by the individual patients, if they had been 
competent.93 
The use of this standard in Rogers extended the supreme judicial 
court's decision in Matter ofMoe 94 which involved the issue of sterili­
zation. In Moe, the court held that guardians must acquire prior judi­
cial approval before they may consent to or refuse proposed 
"extraordinary" medical treatment.95 Since psychotropic drug treat­
ment was characterized as extraordinary at the time, the court in Rog­
ers mandated court approval before forcible medication of an 
incompetent patient in nonemergency situations.96 
The supreme judicial court, moreover, rejected use of the "medi­
cal model" approach to a substituted judgment.97 Under the proce­
dure, a qualified physician rather than a judge would make the 
89. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 499-500, 458 N.E.2d at 315 (quoting Superintendant of 
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745-46, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427-28 
(1977». 
90. Id. at 501-02, 458 N.E.2d at 316. The court indicated in a footnote that its deci­
sion focused on patients who refuse treatment, because the issue generally arises in that 
context. Id. at 500 n.14, 458 N.E.2d at 315 n.14. Further, the court noted that because 
incompetent patients cannot meaningfully consent, a substituted judgment should be un­
dertaken for them even if they accept the medical treatment. Id. 
91. See Roe, 383 Mass. at 434-35, 421 N.E.2d at 51-52. 
92. Id. See Superintendant of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 
750,370 N.E.2d 417, 430 (1977). 
93. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 500, 458 N.E.2d at 316. 
94. 385 Mass. 555, 559, 432 N.E.2d 712, 716 (1982). See also Matter of Spring, 380 
Mass. 629, 639, 405 N.E.2d 115, 122 (1980); Superintendant of Belchertown State School v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 750-51, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-31 (1977); Guardianship of Basset, 
7 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 61, 385 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (1979); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 
377, 385, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (1978). 
95. Moe, 385 Mass. at 559, 432 N.E.2d at 712; See Roe, 383 Mass. at 436-40, 421 
N.E.2d at 51-55 (court discusses why psychotropic drugs are considered "extraordinary" 
treatment). 
96. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 501-02, 458 N.E.2d at 316. 
97. Id. at 502, 458 N.E.2d at 317. 
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substituted judgment. 98 The American Psychiatric Association, which 
filed an amicus curae brief in the case, claimed that the "medical 
model" would protect incompetent patients' civil rights to refuse treat­
ment, while providing the hospital with a qualified medical opinion as 
the basis for the substituted judgment.99 Further, the Association ar­
gued that the "medical model" would provide flexibility in hospital 
administration and avoid the adversarial quality of judicial 
proceedings. 100 
The court disagreed with these arguments. 101 It stated that "no 
medical expertise is required [for making the substituted judgment de­
cision], although medical advice and opinion is to be used for the same 
purposes and sought to the same extent that the individual would, if 
he were competent."102 The court cited inherent conflicts of interest 
as another argument against use of the medical model. 103 It reasoned 
that doctors must maintain order in the hospital as well as treat pa­
tients, and therefore have interests in conflict with their patients who 
wish to avoid medication. l04 A number of courts and commentators 
have voiced these same concerns. !Os 
Once the supreme judicial court in Rogers mandated a judicial 
substituted judgment for incompetent institutionalized patients who 
have refused treatment, it enumerated six factors to be considered by 
the judge in arriving at the substituted judgment: 106 the patients' ex­
pressed preferences regarding treatment; 107 the extent of the patients' 
98. Id. But see Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 35, 355 A.2d 647, 661 (1976). 
99. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 502, 458 N.E.2d at 317. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. (quoting Roe, 383 Mass. at 435, 421 N.E.2d at 52). 
103. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 503, 458 N.E.2d at 317. The court in Roe listed "likeli­
hood of conflicts" as one of five factors to be considered in determining the necessity a 
judicial substituted judgment decision. The other factors included: (I) the intrusiveness of 
the proposed treatment, (2) the possibility of adverse side effects, (3) the absence of emer­
gency, (4) and the nature and extent of prior judicial involvement. Roe, 383 Mass. at 436, 
421 N.E.2d at 52. The court did not address all these factors in its opinion in Rogers. For 
a more detailed discussion, see Roe, 383 Mass. at 436-43, 421 N.E.2d at 52-58. 
104. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 503 & n.19, 458 N.E.2d at 317-18 & n.19. 
105. See supra text accompanying note I. 
106. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 505-7, 458 N.E.2d at 318-19. 
107. Id. at 505, 458 N.E.2d at 318 (quoting Roe, 383 Mass. at 444-45, 421 N.E.2d at 
57). This factor is ironic given that the substituted judgment decision usually takes place 
after patients have refused treatment. As the court noted, however, patients may have 
expressed their preferences before being adjudicated incompetent. Id. If made while com­
petent, such a preference receives great weight unless evidence indicates that the patients 
would have changed their opinions under normal circumstances. Id. Further, even if the 
patients state the preference while incompetent, it is treated as a "critical factor in the 
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religious convictions; 108 the impact of the decision on the patients' 
family; 109 the probability of adverse side effects; lID the prognosis with­
out treatment; III and the prognosis with treatment. 112 If the judge 
orders treatment after considering these factors, he or she should then 
authorize a treatment plan 113 which is subject to periodic review by 
the court. I 14 
C. 	 "Police Power" and the Use ofAntipsychotic Drugs I 15 
The third portion of the court's opinion weighed the institutional 
determination of (their) best interests." Id. (quoting Doe v. Doe, 377 Mass. 272, 277-79, 
385 N.E.2d 995, 1000 (1979». 
108. Id. The court considers patients' religious beliefs "to the extent. . . they may 
contribute to ... [the] refusal of treatment." Id. As the supreme judicial court stated 
"[t]he question to be addressed is whether certain tenets or practices of the incompetent's 
faith would cause him individually to reject the specific course of treatment proposed for 
him in his present circumstances ...." Id. See also cases cited supra note 38. 
109. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 505-6, 458 N.E.2d at 319. This factor takes into account 
the burdens of cost and time on the patient's family for home care or institutional care. 
The focus of this inquiry, however, remains on what the patient would choose if competent. 
Id. 
110. Id. at 506, 458 N.E.2d at 319. This entails an analysis of the "severity of these 
side effects, the probability that they would occur, and the circumstances in which they 
would be endured." Id. (quoting Roe, 383 Mass. at 447, 421 N.E.2d at 58). See supra note 
1 for a description of the adverse effects of antipsychotic drugs. See also Note, A Common 
Law Remedy for Forcible Medication of the Institutionalized Mentally Ill, 82 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1720, 1726-27 (1982); Brooks, The Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medi­
cation, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & LAW 179, 183 (1980). 
Ill. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 506, 458 N.E.2d at 319 (quoting Roe, 383 Mass. at 447-48, 
421 N.E.2d at 58-59). The court noted that probably most patients would wish to avoid a 
steadily worsening condition. The court stipulated, however, that the judge must reach an 
individualized conclusion based on the unique "perspective of the incompetent person." 
Id. 
112. Id. The likelihood of improvement or cure would most likely influence patients' 
treatment decisions. Id. 
113. Id. at 506-07,458 N.E.2d at 319. The court noted that the treatment plan 
should include various specifically identified medications which would be administered 
over a long period of time. Id. 
114. Id. The review is needed so that the court can determine whether the condition 
of the patient has substantially changed. Id. at 507,458 N.E.2d at 319. Once the court 
order has issued, the burden shifts to the incompetent patient's guardian to seek modifica­
tion of the order. Id. 
115. The section addressed certified questions 6 and 7: 

Non-emergency Situations 

6. Under state law, after a proper decision to refuse medication has been made, 
what state interest or interests would be sufficiently compelling to overcome the 
interest of the individual in refusing treatment with antipsychotic drugs? 
Emergency Situations 
7. What standards and procedures are required under state law to make a 
decision forcibly to medicate involuntarily committed patient under the state's 
police power? 
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concerns of the defendants against the plaintiffs' right of self-determi­
nation. Defendants argued that the limitation of their ability to medi­
cate creates unfortunate side effects: "hospital administration becomes 
more difficult, lengths of stay increase, fewer patients are treated, staff 
turnover increases, and new personnel become more difficult to at­
tract."116 The court indicated, however, that the patients' rights to 
make treatment decisions 117 and to be free from the potential abuse of 
medication for administrative convenience I 18 outweighed the listed in­
stitutional considerations. 
The court did recognize that hospitals must protect third persons 
as well as the patients themselves while preserving security within the 
institution. 119 It noted, however, that administering drugs for these 
reasons necessitates strict compliance with the statutory and regula­
tory conditions for use of chemical restraints. 120 These conditions per­
mit restraint of mental health patients only in cases of emergency such 
as extreme violence, personal injury, or attempted suicide, or the seri­
ous threat of any of the foregoing. 121 
The court made very clear that neither hospital physicians nor 
the courts could vary these standards. 122 Only if patients pose an im­
minent threat of harm to themselves or others and only if no less intru­
sive alternative exists may the Commonwealth invoke its police 
powers without prior court approval to treat patients by forcible medi­
cation of antipsychotic drugs. 123 
Id. at 507 n.23, 458 N.E.2d at 319-20 n.23. 
116. Id. at 507,458 N.E.2d at 319-20. 
117. Id. at 507,458 N.E.2d at 320. See Superintendant of Belchertown State School 
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,741-45,370 N.E.2d 417, 426-27 (1977); Contra Commissioner 
of Corrections v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255,266,399 N.E.2d 452, 459 (1979) (prisoner's refusal 
of kidney dialysis may be subordinated to need to operate prison in orderly manner). 
118. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 508, 458 N.E.2d at 520. The court listed numerous law 
review articles and cases which detail the abuse of antipsychotic drugs for administrative 
convenience, punishment, and restraint. Id. at 508-09, 458 N.E.2d at 320-321. See also 
supra text accompanying note 1. 
119. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 509, 458 N.E.2d at 321. 
120. Id. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123, § 21 (West Supp. 1984). See also 104 
MASS. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 104, § 3.12 (2) (1978). "Restraint or seclusion of patients may be 
used only in emergency situations where there is the occurrence or serious threat of ex­
treme violence, personal injury, or attempted suicide." Further, those regulations define 
"restraint" to include mechanical, chemical, and therapeutic restraints. Id. § 3.12 (3). 
121. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123, § 21 (West Supp. 1984). The court indicated 
in a footnote to its decision that it adhered to the definition of emergency as stated in Roe: 
"unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate 
action." Rogers, 390 Mass. at 509 n.25, 458 N.E.2d at 321 n.25 (quoting Roe, 383 Mass. at 
440,421 N.E.2d at 40). 
122. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 510-11, 458 N.E.2d at 321-22. 
123. Id. (emphasis added). Cf Bonnie, supra note 3, at 24 (author argues that the 
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D. 	 Forcible Antipsychotic Medication Essential to Prevent 
"Immediate, Substantial, and Irreversible Deterioration of 
a Serious Mental Illness" 124 
The supreme judicial court reiterated in Rogers its rejection of the 
use of the commonwealth's parens patriae power125 "to do what is 
'best' for citizens despite their own wishes."126 The substituted judg­
ment standard remains the norm in Massachusetts. 127 In Guardian
ship of Roe, the court outlined the rare circumstances in which 
Massachusetts may invoke its parens patriae power and override pa­
tients' refusals of medication absent the threat of violence. 128 It stated 
that noninstitutionalized patients may be treated against their will to 
prevent the "immediate, substantial and irreversible deterioration of a 
serious mental illness."129 
The Rogers ruling extended this standard to include the institu­
tionalized patient. The court stressed, however, that only "interim 
treatment" is allowed under such situations. 13o After patients are 
medicated to avoid immediate deterioration, if doctors wish to con­
tinue such medication, they must first acquire judicial adjudications of 
the patients' incompetence. 131 Such adjudication can be conducted 
through an expedited hearing process provided by Massachusetts 
law.132 If the judge determines that the involuntarily committed pa-
emergency exception actually represents an end-run around both the police power ideology 
and self-determination principles). 
124. The final two certified questions the court addressed were as follows: 
Emergency Situations 
8. Under state law is there a parens patriae state interest in situations where the 
delay that would be occasioned by ordinary recourse to the properly designated 
decision maker could cause a serious deterioration of the patient? 
9. If so, under state law, what procedures must be followed and what standard 
of decisionmaking must be applied to those situations? 
Rogers, 390 Mass. at 511 n.27, 458 N.E.2d at 322 n.27. 
125. "Parens patriae originates from the English common law where the King had a 
royal prerogative to act as guardian to persons with legal disabilities." Although limited by 
recent laws and court decisions, the parens patriae power in the United States belongs with 
the states. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). 
126. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 511,458 N.E.2d at 322. The court relied on its decision in 
Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40, in which it indicated that the state's 
"interest in requiring its residents to function at their maximum capacity" does not out­
weigh the fundamental individual rights asserted therein. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 511, 458 
N.E.2d at 322. 
127. 	 Rogers, 390 Mass. at 511, 458 N.E.2d at 322. 
128. 	 Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. at 448-49, 421 N.E.2d at 59. 
129. 	 Id. at 441, 421 N.E.2d at 55. 
130. 	 Rogerli, 390 Mass. at 512, 458 N.E.2d at 322. 
131. 	 Id. 
132. 	 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.20l, §§ 7, 14 (West 1958); MASS. P. Cr. R. 29. 
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tients are incompetent, he or she must then make a substituted judg­
ment concerning treatment. 133 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The supreme judicial court's decision reflects the general recogni­
tion that mental illness does not automatically render individuals inca­
pable of rational decisionmaking. 134 Psychiatric literature has 
documented many forms of mental illness which impact specifically on 
affected individuals, leaving decision making capacities and reasoning 
abilities unimpaired. 135 Under the Rogers decision, Massachusetts 
physicians must respect those abilities and allow patients to manage 
their personal affairs. 136 Physicians may disregard the rule only in 
emergency situations or when a judge in an incompetency hearing ad­
judicates patients as incompetent. \37 If patients are determined in­
competent, the court must then make a substituted judgment 
treatment decision. 138 Thus, the judiciary is called upon not only to 
determine what constitutes "competency" in terms of treatment deci­
sions but also to ascertain what treatment decision incompetent pa­
tients would have made, if competent. 
It is a difficult task at best to determine whether individuals are 
competent given that no real clinical, medical, or psychiatric criteria 
exist for determining competence. 139 Factors cited as appropriate to 
the finding include: the patients' knowledge that they have choices to 
make; their abilities to understand the available options; their cogni­
133. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 512, 458 N.E.2d at 322. 
134. Id. at 496-98, 458 N.E.2d at 313-14. See Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 442, 421 N.E.2d 
40, 55 (a person is presumed competent even though committed to a public or private 
institution). 
135. See, e.g., J. PAGE, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF UNDERSTANDING 
DEVIANCE 32-35 (1971). The Federal District Court in Rogers stated that the weight of 
evidence persuaded the court that, although committed mental patients do suffer at least 
some impairment of their relationship to reality, most are able to appreciate the benefits, 
risks, and discomfort that are associated with psychotropic medication. Okin v. Rogers, 
478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361 (D. Mass. 1979). 
136. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 496,458 N.E.2d at 313. The court stated that the right to 
make treatment decisions is an essential element of the patient's general right "to manage 
his affairs." Id. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.lll, § 70E (1983), which enumerates 
patients' rights "to refuse to be examined, observed, or treated by students or any other 
facility staff without jeopardizing access to psychiatric, psychological, or other medical 
care," id. at § 70E(h), and to informed consent to the extent provided by law." Id. at 
§ 70E(I). 
137. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.201, § 6 (West SUpp. 1983). 
138. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text. 
139. Michels, Competence to Refuse Treatment, in REFUSING TREATMENT, supra 
note 2, at 115. 
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tive capacities to consider the relevant factors; the absence of interfer­
ing pathologic or emotional states; their awareness of other views and 
attitudes concerning the decision; and an understanding of their rea­
sons for deviating from standard views. l40 Massachusetts incompe­
tency proceedings focus on whether patients are incapable of taking 
care of themselves by reason of mental illness. 141 Under the statutory 
proceeding, the court is at liberty to hear medical testimony and to 
submit individuals to psychiatric examinations. 142 Thus, the consider­
ations deemed relevant to an incompetency finding rely heavily on 
medical opinion. 
The court in Rogers noted that the incompetency proceeding 
under Massachusetts law is the only procedure available for determin­
ing that patients lack the capacity to make treatment decisions. 143 
Limited by the structure of the certification procedure, the court's 
analysis did not address the inadequacies of the present statutory 
procedure. 
While due process protections are required in determining the 
competency issue,'44 no agreement exists as to the necessity or ade­
quacy of judicial decisions. One physician has noted that the compe­
tency determination requires a subtle assessment of patients' reasons 
for refusing medication. 145 Furthermore, the practical meaning of 
competency requires clinical rather than legal expertise because it 
draws on the values of therapeutic need and relative risk. 146 The exist­
ence of conflicts between hospital staffs and patients does indicate the 
need for neutral evaluation or an independent decisionmaker.147 A 
judge, removed from the clinical mileau, provides a neutral or in­
dependent decision, but the decision will not necessarily reflect clinical 
expertise or address the needs of the patient. 
The use of an independent panel of psychiatrists presents an alter­
native to the commonwealth's judicial determination of competence 
and would provide neutral decisionmaking and clinical expertise with­
out requiring judicial involvement. The district court outlined such a 
140. Id. at 117-18. 
141. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.201, § 6 (West Supp. 1984). See Fazio v. Fazio, 
375 Mass. 394, 378 N.E.2d 951 (1978). 
142. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.201, § 6 (West Supp. 1983). 
143. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 497, 458 N.E.2d at 314, (emphasis added). 
144. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. at 1147; Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 
946 (3d Cir. 1976); Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338, 348-49 (W.D. Mo. 1974). See 
also Plotkin, supra note 12, at 491. 
145. Bonnie, supra note 3, at 27. 
146. Id. 
147. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. 
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procedure with its injunctive order in Rennie v. Klein. 148 The court 
ordered the State Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health 
to appoint psychiatrists to serve on a panel. 149 The appointed psychia­
trists retain their independent status as decisionmakers-that is, they 
do not treat the patients who come before the panel for competency 
evaluations. 15o The court reasoned that a psychiatrist would be more 
effective than a judge, lawyer, or layperson in the independent deci­
sionmaker role. 151 
The Rennie court's proposal represents a strong argument in 
favor of the use of a panel of psychiatrists, thus avoiding the untimely 
delays and adversarial nature inherent in the present judicial compe­
tency proceeding in Massachusetts. As one attorney recently argued, 
the competency hearing is largely duplicative since most involuntarily 
committed patients have recently had commitment hearings. 152 Fur­
ther, the costs of such hearings will be significant in terms of treatment 
staff diverted from the hospital.I 53 More importantly, it remains un­
certain whether judicial competency hearings will assure effective pa­
tient treatment. 154 Considering crowded court dockets and the 
amount of time needed for the process itself-i.e. notice, appointment 
of an attorney, hearing time--considerable time will elapse before the 
procedure will be completed. During this period, the patient will re­
main involuntarily committed without treatment. Such a situation not 
only causes administrative problems for the hospital but also allows 
patients' health to deteriorate while under the care of the State. 155 
148. 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1147-48 (1978). 
149. Id. at 1147. 
150. Id. at 1148. 
151. Id. at 1149. See Corney, Patient's Rights: Too Much Courting, Not Enough 
Caring, in REFUSING TREATMENT, supra note 2, at 53. The use of proceedings similar to 
administrative hearings is another alternative to judicial incompetency proceedings and 
substituted judgment treatment decisions. Rhoden, supra note 37 at 406. An administra­
tive officer, rather than a judge, would hold hearings limited to the issue of incompetency to 
make treatment decisions. Id. If patients are found incompetent, hearing officers, having 
heard evidence on the need for treatment and patients' reasons for refusing treatment, 
could then conveniently proceed to make treatment decisions for patients' whose refusals 
were found incompetent. Id. Rhoden argued that consistency, knowledgeability, and neu­
trality could be assured since an unbiased, expert administrative officer would both assess 
incompetency and make treatment decisions. Id. Although such an administrative proce­
dure would not burden the state court system as much as the present procedure in Massa­
chusetts does, its disadvantages parallel those inherent in formal judicial competency 
proceedings; e.g., the adversary nature of the proceedings and their untimeliness. 
152. Corney, supra note 151, at 53. 
153. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18. 
154. Corney, supra note 151, at 53. 
155. See Gill, Side Effects ofa Right to Refuse Treatment Lawsuit; Boston State Hos­
pital Experience, in REFUSING TREATMENT, supra note 2, at 84; Nelson, Should There be a 
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Many of the arguments proffered by opponents of judicial compe­
tency proceedings similarly apply to substituted judgment treatment 
decisions required by the Rogers court. Again, the timeliness of the 
court process in reaching the substituted treatment decision could re­
sult in more unnecessary suffering by the committed patient. 156 An­
other argument states that judges simply are not equipped to make 
medical treatment decisions and that these decisions are best left to the 
physician and family.157 Furthermore, since courts tend to structure 
any procedure as an adversary process, a judicial treatment decision 
will likely create stress and competition between mental patients and 
their doctors, rather than encourage treatment. 15S 
The supreme judicial court in Rogers addressed the concern over 
time-laden judicial proceedings by creating two exceptions to the re­
quirement of judicial approval prior to involuntary treatment. These 
exceptions encompassed the "emergency" situation, i.e., when the pa­
tient harms, or threatens to harm, himself or others,159 and the situa­
tion in which treatment is needed to prevent "immediate, substantial, 
and irreversible deterioration of a serious mental illness." 160 
The exceptions, however, do not dispel other concerns such as the 
adversary nature of judicial proceedings and the inability of judges to 
make treatment decisions. Furthermore, the latter exception only 
postpones the involvement of the jUdiciary. The "immediate, substan­
tial, and irreversible deterioration" exception only provides for interim 
treatment without court approval. I61 If the treating doctors feel that 
the treatment should continue, and the patient refuses, the doctors 
must still seek an adjudication of incompetence and then a substituted 
treatment decision by the judge if the patient is found to be 
Right to Refuse Treatment?, in REFUSING TREATMENT, supra note 2, at 88. See also Mills 
& Gutheil, Legai Approaches to Treating the Treatment-Refusing Patient, in REFUSING 
TREATMENT, supra note 2, at 105 (citing Applebaum & Gutheil, The Boston State Case; 
"Involuntary Mind Control," The Constitution, and The "Right to Rot," 376 AM. I. PSy­
CHIATRY 720-27 (1980)). 
156. Rehlman, The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. I.L. & MED. 
233,234 (1978). Contra Brant, Last Rights: An Analysis ofRefusal and Withholding Treat­
ment Cases, 46 Mo. L. REV. 337, 361 (1981) (author argued that involvement of the judici­
ary in decisions to withhold treatment reflects a recognition that difficult decisions 
involving conflicting rights should be made by judges). 
157. Rehlman, supra note 156, at 234. 
158. Note, supra note 29, at 417. See Parham v. I.R., 442 U.S. 584,610 (1979). 
159. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 510,458 N.E.2d at 321. See infra notes 119-21 and ac­
companying text. 
160. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 511,458 N.E.2d at 322. See infra notes 119-21 and ac­
companying text. 
161. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 512, 458 N.E.2d at 322. See infra notes 130-33 and ac­
companying text. 
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incompetent. 162 
If granting the right to refuse treatment to involuntarily commit­
ted patients had little impact on state hospitals or upon patient treat­
ment, then the state procedural guidelines would most likely be 
adequate. Physicians argue, however, that the impact will be devastat­
ing given that research indicates that more than half of all institution­
alized patients are incompetent to make treatment decisions. 163 If this 
be SO,I64 treatment will become a nightmarish procedural routine re­
quiring constant judicial involvement. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The supreme judicial court's decision in Rogers is significant in 
that it extended the right to involuntarily committed mental patients 
in Massachusetts to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment. Further­
more, the opinion provides clear guidance to disability law advocates 
concerning the substantive rights of and procedural protections for 
mental health patients under state law. More importantly, however, 
the decision indicates the need for a legislative re-evaluation of the 
statutory law governing incompetency proceedings; specifically, 
whether the existing procedures provide the most practical and protec­
tive method for making treatment decisions on behalf of those invol­
untarily committed patients who refuse treatment. This re-evaluation 
is decidedly not the job of the courts. Rather, as Judge Tauro stated 
when this case was before the District Court in Massachusetts "if the 
statutory scheme is burdensome, redress and relief should be sought 
from the legislature."165 Re-evaluation is long past due. 
Katherine E. Perrelli 
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